# The MinRank problem 

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A problem that arose at Crypto'99 [Shamir, Kipnis]:

## Given

Given a field $K$. Let $m, n \in \mathbb{N}, r<n$
We consider $m$ matrices $n \times n$ over $K$.

$$
\begin{gathered}
M_{1}, \ldots, M_{m} \\
\text { The MinRank Problem }
\end{gathered}
$$

Find a linear combination $\alpha \in K^{m}$ of small rank:

$$
\operatorname{Rank}\left(\sum_{i} \alpha_{i} M_{i}\right) \leq r .
$$

## MinRank is NP-complete

[Shallit, Frandsen, Buss 1996]
http://www.brics.dk/RS/96/33/
An effective method to encode any system of multivariate equations !

## MinRank is very difficult in practice.

## Degenerated MinRank

Special Case: all matrices are diagonal:
The Minimal Weight Problem of Error Correcting Codes.
Equivalent to Syndrome Decoding.
Studied a lot for 20 years now...
[Berlekamp,McEliece,Gabidulin,Stern, Chabaud,Canteaut,Véron,...]
All known algorithms for this problem are exponential.

## Algorithms for full MinRank

We proposed 4 algorithms. See:

- Nicolas Courtois, Louis Goubin:
"The Cryptanalysis of TTM", Asiacrypt 2000.
- My PhD thesis April-Mai 2001, Paris 6 University


## Hard instances AD 2000

Let $\mathrm{p}=65521$, the biggest prime $<2^{16}$
Given 10 matrices $6 \times 6$, over $\mathbb{Z}_{p}$. Rank $r=3$.
Best known attack is in $2^{106}$.

## A new Zero-knowledge scheme MinRank

The public key:
$M_{1}, \ldots, M_{m}$.
The secret key:
$\alpha \in G F(p)^{n}$, such that

$$
\begin{gathered}
M=\sum \alpha_{i} \cdot M_{i} \\
\operatorname{Rank}(M)=r<n .
\end{gathered}
$$

## The main idea:

Consider two random non-singular matrices $S$ and $T$.
Consider the probability distribution of

$$
T M S
$$

Just a random matrix of rank $r$ !

## The Prover setup

A uniformly chosen random combination $\beta_{1}$ of $M_{i}$ :

$$
N_{1}=\sum \beta_{1 i} \cdot M_{i}
$$

Let $\beta_{2}=\alpha+\beta_{1}$. Remark: $\beta_{2}$ is just random.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& N_{2}=\sum \beta_{2 i} \cdot M_{i} \\
& N_{2}-N_{1}=M
\end{aligned}
$$

## One round of identification

| Prover | Verifier |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\beta_{1}, \beta_{2}, S, T, X$ |  |
| $H(X), H\left(T N_{1} S+X\right), H\left(T N_{2} S+X\right)$, | $H(S, T)$ |
|  | $?$ |
|  |  |
|  |  |

Case $\mathbf{q}=\mathbf{0}$ : $\quad \xrightarrow[\left(T N_{1} S+X\right),\left(T N_{2} S+X\right)]{ }$

Checks commitments and the rank of
$\left(T N_{2} S+X\right)-\left(T N_{1} S+X\right)=T N_{2} S-T N_{1} S=T M S$.

Case $\mathbf{q}=1,2$ :

$$
X, S, T, \beta_{q}
$$

That relate the committed values to the $M_{i}$.

- It is Black-box Zero-knowledge.
- Cheating probability $\frac{2}{3}$ in 3 moves.

