

GSM and 3G Security Summary and Vocabulary Help,

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| Telco | A national telephone company, in Europe used to be a part of a          |
|-------|---|
|       | government agency PTT = the Postal Telegraph and Telephone              |
| PSTN  | Public Switched Telephone Network - analogue phone network              |
| ISDN  | Integrated Services Digital Network - digital phone standard, 64 kbit/s |
| PSPDN | Packet Switched Public Data Network – modern communication networks     |

0 G = Early analogue mobile phones

0 G MTS: 1946-70s (half-duplex), IMTS: 1969-80s (full duplex, 2000\$, 25 W),

## 1 G = Analogue mobile phones, no security


| US 1 G | 1990s, outdated, see slides by David Wagner from SAC 2002. US          |
|--------|--|
|        | systems: There was no encryption, easy to eavesdrop, criminals played  |
|        | replay attacks and made free calls (2 % of all calls), US losses \$650 |
|        | million/year due to pirate calls                                       |
| NMT    | 1981-2007, 450 MHz, Northern+Eastern Europe, better range than GSM     |
|        | (30 km), late models had analogue scrambling (two-band audio frequency |
|        | inversion, prevents casual listeners).                                 |
|        | DMS Data and Messaging Service or NMT-Text, was used in Russia,        |
|        | Poland and Bulgaria, before SMS service started in GSM!                |
| FDMA   | Frequency DMA, multiple carrier bands at 450 and 850 MHz, 2.4 kbits/s  |

2 G = Digital mobile phones

| Early US  | All security was broken (XOR mask + CMEA , ORYX, CAVE), Cf. Wagner      |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| GSM       | Groupe Special Mobile [French, 1982] later pretended to be Global       |  |  |  |  |  |
| [EU,      | System for Mobile Communications [by ETSI, 1989, in English],           |  |  |  |  |  |
| Asia,Aus] | 2W max, 13K bits/sec for speech 9.6 K for data (speech+ECC=22.8 k) on   |  |  |  |  |  |
| _         | one TDMA channel out of theoretical capacity 270 kbits/s (time-shared). |  |  |  |  |  |
| TDMA      | Time Division Multiple Access – air interface of GSM. 1 burst=0.577 ms. |  |  |  |  |  |
| CDMA      | Code-based Division Multiple Access, based on orthogonal sequences.     |  |  |  |  |  |
| [US]      | Also set of 2G standards renamed cmdaONE, competitor of GSM, no         |  |  |  |  |  |
|           | smart cards, royalties=>Qualcomm<=chips. Better density !               |  |  |  |  |  |


## 2.5 G and 2.75 G technologies


| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service. Up to 8 time slots, with 9-21.4 Kbits/sec |  |  |  |  |
|------|---|--|--|--|--|
|      | each (variable error correcting rate CS1-CS4), 3-5 slots used (Class2-  |  |  |  |  |
|      | 12) up to 48 Kbit/sec with Class 12 (serve more people - save money)    |  |  |  |  |
| EDGE | Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution, 8 faster slots used,             |  |  |  |  |
|      | up to 8x48 = 384 kbit/s, EDGE Evolution: 1 Mbit/s, lower latency        |  |  |  |  |



| M  | S: Mobile Station     |                 | VLR: | Visited Location Register        |
|----|-----------------------|-----------------|------|----------------------------------|
| BS | S: Base Station Syste | m               | OMC: | Operation and Maintenance Centre |
| M  | SC: Mobile Services S | witching Centre | EIR: | Equipment Identity Register      |
| H  | LR: Home Location R   | egister         | AUC: | Authentication Centre            |


| MS       | Mobile Subscriber = ME+SIM   |  |  |  |  |  |
|----------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| ME       | Mobile Equipment   |  |  |  |  |  |
| SIM      | Subscriber Identity Module   |  |  |  |  |  |
| IMEI     | International Mobile Equipment Identity – unique for each ME               |  |  |  |  |  |
| IMSI     | International Mobile Subscriber Identity – unique for each SIM, 15 digits. |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | Used in exceptional circumstances, when the BTS asks for it, then the MS   |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | receives encrypted TIMSI to be used later                                  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TIMSI    | Temporary pseudonym that is really used, even when roaming to another      |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | network, 5 digits, changed on a regular basis [another encrypted TIMSI]    |  |  |  |  |  |
| LAI      | Local Area Information – uniquely identifies one base station              |  |  |  |  |  |
| EIR      | Equipment Identity Register = List of IMEIs in one network                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| BTS      | Base Transceiver Station   |  |  |  |  |  |
| handover | Moving from one BTS to another (e.g. when walking)                         |  |  |  |  |  |
| BSC      | Base Station Controller – manages handover,                                |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | connected to multiple BTS and MSC  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BSS      | Base Station System=1 BSC + several BTS                                    |  |  |  |  |  |
| roaming  | Moving to another network operator (same or another country)               |  |  |  |  |  |
| MSC      | Mobile Switching Centre: manages the communications between different      |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | mobiles and PSTN   |  |  |  |  |  |
| SGSN     | Serving GPRS Support Node - delivers packets to MSs within its service     |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | area through multiple BTSs   |  |  |  |  |  |
| OMC      | Operation and Maintenance Centre (manages MSCs and the whole               |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | network).  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AuC      | Authentication Centre  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HLR      | Home Location Register. Part of AuC.                                       |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | -Knows where to connect incoming call (which network, which cell).         |  |  |  |  |  |
|          | Home Location Register. Part of AuC.                                       |  |  |  |  |  |





| AuC    | -Generates in advance triples (RAND, SRES, Kc)   |  |  |  |  |  |
|--------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| HLR    | Knows where to connect an incoming call  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | -Stores many triples (RAND, SRES, Kc)  |  |  |  |  |  |
| VLR    | In the host network (can be in another country).   |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | -Receives and stores the triples for each TIMSI.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ki     | Diversified unique MS key on 128 bits, known only to SIM and AuC.  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | Generated from master key + IMSI + optional data. By the operator.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| A3,A8  | Proprietary authentication (MAC = keyed hash) algorithms implemented in<br>the SIM, operator dependent. Share common 128-bit input, common key<br>Ki on 128 bits. Can be the same algorithm with two different outputs.<br>Example: COMP128 – very insecure provided as a weak example<br>Input: RAND on 128 bits<br>Output A3: 32 bit MAC called SRES (Signed RESponse) |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | Output A8: Kc on 64 bits, 54 really used in A5/1 (the strongest before   |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | A5/3=Kasumi=only in 3G phones, not yet used in GSM).   |  |  |  |  |  |
| A5/0-3 | Public voice encryption algorithms, implemented in the phone, the station chooses which to use.<br>Initialised with Kc and IV = frame number on 22 bits.   |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | Produces only 114 bits of keystream for this IV. These bits are XORed to   |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | the encoded (voice+) frame. (228 bits are sent in both directions).  |  |  |  |  |  |
| A5/2   | Excessively weak though designed using 15.75 man x months and<br>all members of SAGE stated that they were satisfied that [A5/2] was<br>suitable to protect against eavesdropping on the GSM radio path" - ETSI<br>TR 278  |  |  |  |  |  |
| A5/1   | Almost secure enough but not used correctly at all: Biham Crypto 2003  |  |  |  |  |  |


**GSM** Authentication and Encryption



- A3: Challenge-reply authentication 128->32 bits.
- A8: Session key Kc derivation 64 bits used for 1 phone call.
- A5/X: stream encryption of short frames of 114 bits.


No authentication of the network -> phone. Fixed in UMTS.

SIM Card side and data/key sizes



- BS transmits to ME a 128-bit challenge RAND
- ME returns SRES on 32 bits
- K<sub>i</sub> size: 56-128 bits, proprietary
- RAND and K<sub>i</sub> are combined with A8 to get a 64-bit key K<sub>c</sub>.
- this key  $K_c$  + frame number on 22 bits are used to encrypt blocks of 114 bits.
- Redundant data frames are encrypted + stream cipher => ciphertext-only attacks. GSM is BROKEN!






## 3G vocabulary

| UMTS   | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System, or 3GPP, main 3G mobile       |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|        | phone system. [Competitor: CDMA 2000]. Permanent 2Mbit/sec (pico cell,    |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | antenna on the building in front of you) and otherwise 144 Kbits/sec.     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| W-CDMA | Wideband Code Division Multiple Access, the air interface of UMTS,        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | royalties=>Qualcomm   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HSDPA, | Extension of UMTS canal DCH for mobile broadband,                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 G+   | now 3.6 Mbit/s and even 7.2 Mbit/s (Release 6) at some locations.         |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SGSN   | GPRS Support Node   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GGSN   | Gateway GPRS Support Node   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SMS-   | Gateway MSC For Short Message Service, A function of an MSC capable       |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GMSC   | of receiving a short message from an SC, interrogating an HLR for routing |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | information and SMS info, and delivering the short message to the VMSC    |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        | or the SGSN of the recipient MS.  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|        |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |

3G security



| A5/3 =  | Voice encryption algorithm + integrity algorithm, 128-bit keys, also added |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Kasumi  | to the GSM standard (which explains the name)                              |  |  |  |  |  |
|         | CK=cipher key on 128 bits <= freshness, limited usage                      |  |  |  |  |  |
|         | IK =integrity key on 128 bits  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AKA     | Authentication and Key Agreement (the whole 3G security protocol)          |  |  |  |  |  |
| MAC     | f1_K(SQN    RAND    AMF) - on 64 bits                                      |  |  |  |  |  |
| SQN     | Sequence number of 48 bits   |  |  |  |  |  |
| AMF     | Authentication Management Field on 16 bits                                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| AK      | Anonymity key on 128 bits  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AUTN    | 128 bits: network authentication token = SQN xor AK    AMF    MAC          |  |  |  |  |  |
| Quintet | (RAND, XRES, CK, IK, AUTN)   |  |  |  |  |  |
| USIM    | Operator specific algorithm for f1,f2,f3,f4,f5                             |  |  |  |  |  |
| algos   | One example is MILENAGE, based on AES, but usually proprietary             |  |  |  |  |  |

## Crypto comparison GSM vs. 3G

| GSM                                 |        |     | UMTS                                   |        |     |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----|--|--------|-----|
| Description                         | Bits   | Alg | Description                            | Bits   | Alg |
| Ki Subscriber<br>authentication key | 128    |     | K Subscriber<br>authentication key     | 128    |     |
| RAND random challenge               | 128    |     | RAND random challenge                  | 128    |     |
| XRES exepected result               | 32     | A3  | XRES expected result                   | 32-128 | f2  |
| Kc cipher key                       | 64 max | A8  | Ck cipher key                          | 128    | f3  |
|                                     |        |     | IK integrity key                       | 128    | f4  |
|                                     |        |     | AK anonimity key                       | 48     | f5  |
|                                     |        |     | SQN sequence number                    | 48     |     |
|                                     |        |     | AMF authentication<br>management field | 16     |     |
|                                     |        |     | MAC message auth. Code                 | 64     | f1  |
| Example : algorithm<br>COMP128-1    |        |     | Example : algorithm<br>Milenage        |        |     |